Most studies that attempt to understand immigrant political incorporation focus on patterns of electoral participation and citizenship acquisition. Given that nearly 60 percent of the foreign-born population in the United
Interestingly, the political arena has largely been ignored by sociologists who study immigration (see Bloemraad 2006; Waters 2008) . Mainly the domain of political scientists, political incorporation has been commonly defined as participation in formal electoral politics, and most studies rely on national data to capture patterns of voting and citizenship acquisition. Studies in this tradition have examined how ethnic and racial groups-and more recently, new immigrants-participate in the democratic process and how their group interests have been articulated and represented in public policy (Fraga and Ramirez 2003; Jones-Correa 2005) .
While past studies provide useful insights regarding immigrant political incorporation, they are limited in three important ways. First, immigrants become naturalized citizens and vote in local and national elections, but citizens and noncitizens alike participate in a host of alternative political activities such as protest and public claims making. Given that nearly 60 percent of the foreign-born population in the United States is not eligible to vote, studies that exclusively focus on formal measures of political participation miss a vital part of the incorporation process among new immigrants. A second limitation is that past studies typically use individual-level indicators and predictors to understand the extent to which immigrants are becoming part of the American political process, often neglecting collective measures of political incorporation that capture the capacity and integration of immigrants as a group, and the importance of social and political contexts in shaping collective outcomes. Finally, case studies of political incorporation that often do address the broader social context in understanding immigrants' participation in voting and citizenship acquisition rarely look beyond traditional immigrant gateways, and it is not clear to what extent these findings apply to areas where immigrants have not historically settled in large numbers over long periods of time. It is also not clear if the same social and political conditions would apply to forms of nonelectoral political participation, such as protest.
In this study, we move beyond measures of formal political participation and focus on understanding the conditions that facilitate immigrant collective action-publicly enacted, group-based efforts in pursuit of a common goal such as changing state policy or challenging discriminatory action-in different areas across the United States. Much like other disenfranchised groups, new immigrants generally lack access to formal institutions of power. Because of their social status and position outside of the power structure (and for some, their lack of documentation and U.S. citizenship), immigrants have learned how to organize and participate in public protests to raise the visibility of issues that significantly affect their communities, providing an avenue for social and political change (see Martinez 2008; Okamoto 2003) . Immigrants are becoming part of the American mainstream by using strategies and tactics that are acceptable for making claims outside of electoral arenas, and by invoking a shared minority status based on race, ethnicity, citizenship, and/or language to challenge forms of exclusion and discrimination. These collective efforts represent an understudied yet vital part of the political incorporation process. By focusing on immigrant collective action, this article extends our knowledge regarding how and to what extent groups become politically engaged in local communities, which has broader implications for the representation of group interests in the political process.
Theoretically, we assert that local conditions should play an important role in the emergence of immigrant organizing. We examine the influence of political opportunities and resources that are available in local contexts, but we are particularly interested in the processes that establish and reinforce group boundaries and a collective minority status. Specifically, we draw upon the concept of bright and blurry boundaries (Alba 2005) to understand immigrant minority incorporation and investigate whether conditions heightening group boundaries between immigrants and natives facilitate immigrant collective action. When "bright" boundaries are reinforced through mechanisms such as threats and segregation, immigrants may develop common interests and intergroup ties through their shared experiences as well as a collective minority status, providing the conditions for immigrant protest. We test these theoretical ideas using a new data set comprised of over 200 immigrant protests occurring in the year 2000 in metropolitan areas across the United States, the majority of which are outside of traditional immigrant gateways.
1 To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the conditions influencing immigrant collective action in different locations across the United States.
Political Incorporation and Collective Action
Past studies have used naturalization and voting behavior as the main indicators of immigrant political incorporation (Arvizu and Garcia 1996; DeSipio 2001; Hritzuk and Park 2000; Liang 1994; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989; Yang 1994) . This research has generally supported the straight-line assimilation model and shown that increased years in the United States, higher generational status, educational attainment, and English-language ability are associated with voting participation and citizenship acquisition among immigrants.
Some studies in the literature have used survey data to analyze a broader range of immigrant political activity (Barreto and Munoz 2003; Hero and Campbell 1996; Junn 1999; Martinez 2005; Wrinkle et al. 1996) . For example, national surveys of Asian Americans and Latinos have asked respondents whether they participated in alternative political activities such as writing to a government official, signing a petition for a political cause, volunteering for a political candidate, or donating money to a political campaign or organization. Analyzing the patterns of these activities revealed that they were more common than voter turnout among immigrants who had resided in the United States for less than ten years (Wong 2006) .
Research in this area has also shown that membership in a panethnic organization and being contacted by a family member, friend, or person in the community are consistently related to participation in political activities besides voting (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004) . Similarly, a recent study surveyed Turkish and Moroccan respondents in the United States and the Netherlands and found that membership in organizations increased participation in noninstitutional political activities (Klandermans, van der Toorn, and van Stekelenburg 2008) . In support of past findings, case studies of immigrant organizing emphasize the importance of immigrant networks and organizations in generating political participation among immigrants (Barreto et al. 2009; Benjamin-Alvarado, DeSipio, and Montoya 2008; Bloemraad and Trost 2008; Flores-Gonzalez et al. 2006) . For example, Ruth Milkman and Kent Wong (2001) discovered that in addition to the support of immigrant organizations, close kin and friendship ties among immigrants working in the drywall trade in Los Angeles were critical in generating a successful campaign for workers' rights. In general, past studies provide insights into the political incorporation of immigrants with a focus on the patterns and predictors of individual participation in a range of political activities, but they do not examine how broader contextual factors shape collective organizing efforts among immigrants across different locations.
A handful of recent studies has demonstrated that the differing political contexts of traditional gateways influence the political incorporation of immigrants (see Jones-Correa 1998 Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross 2005; Wong 2006 ). This research compares the ways in which immigrants engage in the political process across city and national contexts, and are mostly based on case studies that provide vivid details of the political activities, contexts, and even perceptions and motivations of new immigrant groups as they navigate the political system. For example, in her comparative study of immigrant political incorporation in Toronto and Boston, Irene Bloemraad (2006) investigated how Vietnamese refugees and Portuguese immigrants across two national contexts acquire formal citizenship and participate in political life through community organizations. She explained that the successful political incorporation of 1. Traditional immigrant gateways such as Los Angeles and New York are metropolitan areas with total populations over one million where foreign-born percentages have been higher than the national average every decade since 1950 (Singer 2004) . We refer to all other metropolitan areas in this study as new destinations.
immigrants is largely due to the political opportunity structure, which includes the host country's political institutions, integration policies, and administrative bureaucracies.
New studies on immigrant mobilization in Europe also constitute an exception to past research on political incorporation. These studies focus on immigrant claims making and the broader institutional environment to understand the emergence of group action (see Danese 1998; Giugni and Passy 2004; Pechu 1999) . For example, Ruud Koopmans and his colleagues (2005) argued that national political contexts and configurations of citizenship shape the possibilities for immigrant claims making in public debates in the European context. They found that despite Switzerland's open political opportunity structure and consensus-oriented political culture, citizenship is relatively closed to newcomers, and this negatively influenced immigrants' access to the process of policy making, especially when compared to Britain and the Netherlands, which have broader citizenship laws.
In sum, the political incorporation of contemporary immigrants is a relatively understudied phenomenon, and the variation of immigrant political participation across multiple contexts in the United States is relatively unexplored. Scholars studying immigrant political participation often use individual characteristics to understand political action, but this approach fails to address the broader context where collective identities are formed and collective action unfolds. Studies that address the broader context tend to emphasize the importance of political opportunities without attesting to other social factors that might encourage organizing among a disenfranchised group. We build upon past research to develop an improved understanding of political incorporation in the United States through an analysis of immigrant collective action.
Theoretical Frameworks and New Hypotheses

Political Opportunity and Resources
Clearly, past research has shown that the political environment is key to understanding immigrant political participation. One central theoretical framework developed in the social movements literature suggests that political opportunities help to explain the emergence of collective action (McAdam 1982; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004) . Political opportunities are broadly understood as elements and conditions of the political environment that provide incentives for political action (Tarrow 1994) . Typically defined as the relative openness of the political system to challenging groups and the presence or absence of sympathetic elites, political opportunities can affect how minority groups are accorded rights and privileges (Klandermans 2001) . More importantly, these conditions can convey to group members that collective organizing will be a successful strategy in reaching their goals, facilitating protest activity. In an extensive comparative study of immigrant mobilization across different national contexts, Koopmans and colleagues (2005) found that institutional openings in the formal political structure such as ease of access to naturalization, voting rights, and state-sponsored anti-discrimination agencies, were important in understanding immigrant claims making, bolstering the idea that a supportive political environment can improve the prospects for collective organizing among groups who traditionally do not have access to political power.
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Another theoretical framework associated with the social movements literature is resource mobilization. Scholars in this tradition focus on the importance of access to economic and organizational resources for successful collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 2. Koopmans and associates (2005) also point out that discursive political opportunities-aspects of the public discourse that determine which claims will diffuse throughout the public sphere-play a key role in shaping the success of immigrant mobilization. We do not discuss discursive opportunities here because we are interested in the emergence of collective action, not whether it achieves success in affecting policy or shaping public attitudes. 1978). Some scholars have conceptualized resources as internal to the group: communities that possess leadership skills, finances, and access to elite networks tend to be associated with higher levels of collective organizing. For example, John McCarthy and associates (1988) found that high levels of educational attainment in local communities served as a key resource that led to the formation and success of local citizen action groups against drunk driving. Other research has focused on the link between organizational resources and emergent collective action. In particular, scholars have generally found that local organizations play a central role in immigrant and ethnic minority mobilization (Bloemraad 2006; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wong 2006) . In a study on nonelectoral political activities, Lisa Martinez (2008) discovered that Latinos were more likely to participate in a public meeting, demonstration, letter writing campaign, or boycott when they lived in cities with greater numbers of Latino organizations. These organizations not only provide access to information, finances, and organizational skills, but they serve as a base for the emergence of social movements.
Simply focusing on political opportunities and resources to understand immigrant collective organizing misses a part of the explanatory puzzle. These theoretical frameworks are incomplete because they do not address the factors that encourage new immigrants to develop shared interests and form a collective minority status. In particular, the conditions intensifying group boundaries between immigrants and natives should play an important role in this process.
Group Boundaries and the Construction of a Collective Status and Identity
To understand the process of immigrant incorporation, a number of scholars have turned to the concept of boundaries. Group boundaries are conceptual distinctions that individuals make in their everyday lives when categorizing objects, people, and practices (Alba 2005; Lamont and Molnar 2002) . Boundaries define who or what belongs in which category, and can generate feelings of similarity and group membership (Epstein 1992) . They can also be used as a device to reproduce patterns of exclusion from material resources and preserve social privileges for established groups.
According to Aristide Zolberg and Woon Long (1999) , immigrant incorporation is an interactive process, where hosts and newcomers negotiate to define the boundaries of their own groups. Cultural elements such as language and religion, which distinguish between newcomers and hosts, are used to construct group boundaries and collective identities. Drawing upon this literature, Richard Alba (2005) introduced the idea of bright and blurry boundaries as a conceptual way to understand the assimilation process for immigrant minorities. Some group boundaries are "bright," where the distinction between immigrants and natives is unambiguous. In this situation, individuals know which side of the boundary they are on at all times. Other boundaries are "blurry," where individuals may appear to belong on one side of boundary at certain times and on the other side of the boundary at other times. Alba explains that the nature of the immigrant-native boundary is shaped by how it has been institutionalized in different domains such as language, citizenship, and race. In turn, the nature of the boundarywhether it is bright or blurry-affects the processes by which individuals gain access to the opportunities afforded to the majority group.
In the U.S. case, Alba argues that racial minority status, and to a lesser degree language, are associated with immigrants and the second generation (also see Jiménez 2008; Lee, Ramakrishnan, and Ramirez 2006; Telles and Ortiz 2008; Tuan 1998) . Because most contemporary immigrants are nonwhite, the immigrant-native boundary tends to be bright. 3 We draw upon Alba's notion of a bright boundary to understand the conditions that generate immigrant organizing. Specifically, we explore the idea that conditions heightening group boundaries between immigrants and natives-those conditions that enable group boundaries to remain bright-could be important in generating a collective minority status based on race, ethnicity, citizenship, and/or language among immigrants. If the interactive process of negotiation between newcomers and established groups continually reinforces the boundary between "us" and "them," immigrants will begin to recognize their shared interests, see themselves as a larger group, and participate in group action based on this shared minority status. In other words, if group boundaries remain bright, strategies such as boundary crossing or shifting, which allow immigrants to move to the other side of the group boundary, will not be possible (see Zolberg and Long 1999) . In such a situation, where intergroup boundaries are highly impermeable and assimilation options are not readily available, group members may choose to become more solidary and participate in collective strategies to raise the status of their group (see Ellemers et al. 1988; Hechter [1975 Hechter [ ] 1999 Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1979) . Here, we acknowledge the dynamic process involved with bright and blurry boundaries; they are not static, but are influenced by larger social conditions as well as micro-level interactions.
Group Threats. Scholars studying ethnicity and panethnicity suggest that threats 4 can encourage ethnic groups to expand their boundaries to include ethnic others, creating a larger collective to protect group interests (Conzen et al. 1992; Espiritu 1992; Olzak 1992) . In this literature, threats are represented as constraints on achieving full social citizenship and integration for ethnic groups, and they often take the form of xenophobic or racist attacks against ethnic group members. Such attacks are meant to keep minority group members from the opportunities and privileges that dominant group members enjoy. These kinds of threats serve as boundary markers because they reinforce the idea that these boundaries cannot be crossed; they serve to maintain the brightness of group boundaries, especially when they become institutionalized (Taylor and Whittier 1992) .
Official language laws passed in over 30 states across the United States can be considered symbols of exclusion that reinforce social boundaries between immigrants and natives. Under such laws, if immigrants are unable to speak their mother tongues at school and in the workplace, or if such laws deliberately limit services for those with limited English proficiency, this could encourage immigrants to organize as a collective group because they are all affected by the same restrictive laws. Past research has pointed to the importance of legislative threatsgovernmental policies that restrict immigrants' rights-in triggering reactive mobilization efforts of immigrants in the political arena through citizenship or voting (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramakrishnan 2005) . In a recent study on the immigrant marches in 2006, Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and his colleagues (2008) found that the anti-immigrant rhetoric of H.R. 4437 facilitated immigrant mobilization in new destination states such as Nebraska. The national threat heightened group boundaries between immigrants and natives, and this led to unprecedented levels of organizing across the United States.
Drawing upon this literature, we argue that threats against immigrants should heighten group boundaries and encourage collective action among immigrant groups. These threats reinforce and legitimate the distinction between immigrants and natives in terms of differential 4. Many social movement scholars conceptualize threat and political opportunity as separate and distinct concepts, even though both can be a part of the political opportunity structure (see Van Dyke 2003; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Ebert 2009; McCammon and Campbell 2002) . Political opportunities in the form of elite allies or an open political environment generally convey to group members that their collective action efforts are likely to be successful (McAdam 1996) . Threats, on the other hand, are defeats in the political arena marked by legislation or countermovements, which suggest to group members that they are not progressing toward their collective goal (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Tilly 1978 ). Although we also conceptualize threats as separate from political opportunities, we hypothesize that they will heighten boundaries between immigrants and natives, and in turn instigate immigrant collective action. access to education, the right to work, and other civil liberties (see Olzak and Shanahan 2003) . For immigrants, threats instigate collective action based on this shared status when immigrant groups are faced with exclusion and discrimination on the basis of citizenship, language, and immigrant status from established groups. According to this literature, threats will encourage immigrant collective action.
Group Segregation. In addition to threats, the process and practice of segregation reinforces social and symbolic boundaries and has been used to explain ethnic solidarity and collective action. The cultural division of labor theory claims that when ethnic groups are clustered in the occupational structure, group solidarity will be based on ethnicity, and under such conditions, ethnic collective action is likely (Hechter [1975 (Hechter [ ] 1999 . The term "cultural" is broad-based because it includes groups whose distinctiveness is based on ethnicity as well as groups who share a linguistic, religious, or even phenotypic background that differs from the larger majority. The theory posits that a shared identity will arise among group members who are concentrated in similar jobs and occupations. Centralized workplaces and cooperative work strategies will contribute to high levels of interaction where group members come to depend upon one another for successful work outcomes, reinforcing ethnic boundaries (Cornell and Hartmann 1998). Additionally, group solidarity will increase if the positions in the labor market are only available to ethnic group members because they live and work together in an ethnic economy or have sole access to particular occupations because of closed social networks (Waldinger and Lichter 2003) . In support of this theoretical framework, a study of Asian American collective action demonstrated that when Asian ethnic groups were occupationally segregated from whites, this fostered panethnic interests and networks which in turn heightened group boundaries and facilitated organizing efforts across ethnic lines (Okamoto 2003) . Thus, labor markets can play an important role in group formation and collective action because of the dynamics occurring within them, which shape how ethnic groups relate to one another and to the majority group.
In terms of our research, because immigrants are often located in similar jobs and occupational sectors where they work side by side each day (especially in new destinations where they are concentrated in farming, service work, and factory work), they are likely to share information, develop common interests, and generate solidarity with their fellow laborers more so than with others. The workplace is where they will establish connections to union organizing and it is likely that this is where their political identities begin to form in the U.S. context (see Milkman 2000) . These dynamics may also be at work in residential settings where group members live side by side and establish connections within their neighborhoods.
Past research indicates that neighborhoods and electoral districts with high concentrations of immigrants or ethnic minorities tend to have low voter turnout (de la Garza 1996; DeSipio 1996), but we suspect that immigrant collective action as a form of political incorporation operates differently from electoral participation. Groups can have a dramatic influence on elections, but the act of voting is ultimately an individual act. An individual can expect to receive little in return when casting her vote, but when an individual participates in collective action, she can receive immediate and long-term returns from the larger group, especially if she depends upon the larger group for certain benefits and resources. Given that protest activity is collective, there are likely to be different mechanisms at work to encourage group compared to individual action. The extent to which the immigrant community is segregated from the established local population in labor markets and residential spaces could heighten the boundary between immigrants and natives, contributing to the development of a shared minority status and identity, and in turn, increasing the likelihood of group action based on that status and identity. This theoretical framework predicts that immigrant-native segregation will encourage immigrant collective action.
In sum, we argue that boundary markers, such as threats exacted against immigrants and the segregation of immigrants and natives, will solidify a collective and shared minority status among immigrants, and encourage protest activity. Access to resources and supportive political environments are important to collective organizing, but may not be enough to spur political group action among new immigrants. Newcomers who arrive in the United States with identities based on region, dialect, or tribe may not yet see themselves as part of an immigrant group with specific goals. Unless the boundary between immigrants and natives is heightened, collective action on the part of immigrants will be unlikely.
Data and Methods
Research Design
To test these theoretical ideas about immigrant political organizing in the United States, we created an original data set of immigrant collective action events occurring in 52 metropolitan areas in 2000 (see Table 1 ). While traditional forms of political incorporation are often studied at the county level, our data show that counties may be too small to capture regional traits that are likely to diffuse across county boundaries and influence immigrant collective action (see Baller et al. 2001 ). In addition, group segregation-one of our boundary variables-is most appropriately measured at the metropolitan level since these areas are reasonable approximations of labor and housing markets (see Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2002) . We also find that the majority of the events in our sample had a geographic reach to the metropolitan area.
Our research design marks a significant improvement from past studies because we did not select metropolitan areas based on whether immigrant collective action occurred in these areas. We initially focused our data collection efforts on "new immigrant destinations"-metropolitan areas that experienced growth in percent foreign born in the final decades of the twentieth century (see Singer 2004)-because the immigrant incorporation literature typically focuses on traditional immigrant gateways that have established histories of immigration. We soon discovered, however, that there was limited research on immigrant collective action in any locale. Thus, we expanded our sample, but were unable to randomly select the metropolitan areas in our study due to data availability. Our research relies on newspaper data (see section on data collection for more details) and not all newspapers were available in a searchable online database for the year 2000. Among metropolitan areas with a total population of at least 100,000 5 where the primary newspaper (e.g., Atlanta Journal-Constitution for Atlanta) was available for the year 2000, we selected a purposive sample that varied in terms of immigrant populations and other theoretically relevant characteristics, including type of immigrant destination (see Singer 2004; Singer and Wilson 2006) , percent foreign born, percent change in foreign born, and residential and occupational segregation.
Our sample varies by region, population size, and state, and includes large metropolitan areas such as Atlanta and Charlotte, which experienced rapid growth in their foreign-born populations between 1980 and 2000, as well as smaller metropolitan areas such as Reno and Modesto where foreign-born populations were above average during the same period. Areas such as Detroit and Fayetteville, which have experienced below-average growth in their foreign-born populations in recent decades, are also represented. Our sample also includes prominent immigrant gateways such as New York and Los Angeles, which enables us to compare metropolitan areas with long histories of immigration to those areas experiencing recent increases in their immigrant populations.
In the end, our selection methods procured a sample of metropolitan areas that is relatively representative of all metropolitan areas in the United States. We confirmed this by comparing the mean values of the variables in our analysis for the 52 metropolitan areas in our sample 5. We only included metropolitan areas with populations of at least 100,000 in the year 2000 so that we would be able to calculate reliable estimates of some of our independent variables (see Iceland 2009 ). with the 331 metropolitan statistical areas in the United States. 6 One exception is the average percent change in the foreign-born population from 1990 to 2000, which is greater in the metropolitan areas in our study than in all metropolitan areas in the United States (135 percent and 80 percent, respectively). This is because a number of the metropolitan areas in our sample are new immigrant destinations. In addition, the average population of the metropolitan areas in our study is larger than that of all metropolitan areas in the United States
Data Collection
To create our data set of immigrant collective action events, we follow in the tradition of protest event research and draw upon newspapers as our main source of data (Koopmans et al. 2005; McAdam and Su 2002; Olzak 1992; Rucht, Koopmans, and Neidhardt 1998; Shanahan et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2001; Tarrow 1989; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004) . Newspapers are one of the only sources that provide a historical record of a given time and place, covering a range of activities that occur, and including details about the location, participants, and duration of events across multiple geographic areas (see Earl et al. 2004; Koopmans and Rucht 2002) . For our study, we conducted a systematic search of 71 daily local newspapers 7 in 52 U.S. metropolitan areas. While newspapers are a useful source of data, they are not without limitations. The main criticism regarding the use of these data in event analysis is that not all events are covered in newspapers (selection bias). In fact, past studies indicate that national newspapers tend to report on large events characterized by conflict more often than smaller, peaceful events (Barranco and Wisler 1999; Oliver and Myers 1999) . To address this issue, we gathered data on events from local newspapers in different metropolitan areas because past studies have found that the use of local sources reduces this bias (see Hocke 1999; McCarthy McPhail, and Smith 1996; Snow, Soule, and Cress 2005) . While some of the newspapers were much larger than others and had a broader geographic range in terms of circulation, each newspaper in our sample had a local section that covered events and activities in the metropolitan area. By using newspapers that serve a particular city or region, we were able to capture a larger number of smaller events, and gain a much better picture of each metropolitan area than if we would have used one newspaper such as The New York Times to cover events across multiple locales.
An additional issue with newspaper data is reporting bias: when events are covered, the facts reported may not be accurate. To minimize this problem, we searched more than one newspaper per metropolitan area when available to glean as much information as possible on specific events, increasing our chances of gathering accurate data. However, increasing the quantity of our data sources sacrifices some reliability because of selection bias in reporting across different newspapers. To address the possibility of across-metropolitan area bias in our models, we controlled for the number of newspapers searched and the number of available articles per capita in each metropolitan area. While we are unable to entirely eliminate the problem of selection bias, we found that the inclusion of both variables that capture variation in the number and size of newspapers across metropolitan areas did not affect our results nor were they significant in the models, providing us with confidence that the count of events for larger metropolitan areas does not simply reflect our use of larger and/or additional newspapers.
To find candidate events, we used the generic descriptor strategy and searched for articles with relevant keywords in any part of the text (see Oliver and Maney 2000) . 8 Events that met 6. Available upon request from authors. 7. The newspaper databases included Access World News, LexisNexis Academic, and ProQuest Newspapers. In this article, we only use English-language newspapers, but we are in the process of collecting data from Spanish-language newspapers from a small sample of metropolitan areas.
8. Our keywords included immigrant, immigration, migrant, Latino, Hispanic, Asian, Mexican, Vietnamese, Chinese, Indian, Filipino, Muslim, Chicano, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, and Spanish. Our strategy was to cast a wide net when searching for relevant articles. the selection criteria were public and collective, where immigrants were the main organizers and participants who expressed claims or grievances on behalf of the larger immigrant group (Olzak 1992) . 9 Our main focus is on protest events that challenge the status quo and are often directed at influencing policy outcomes. We did not include educational, cultural, or religious events because even though such public gatherings involved the collective efforts of immigrants, their primary aim was not political claims making. We did not limit our sample to those events where the foreign-born population was reported as being involved; we included the collective efforts of Latinos and Asians as well as ethnic-specific groups if they had immigrantrelated claims. While our search was systematic, our sample does not represent a complete universe of events. Instead, it represents visible events that reached the public arena and a lower-bound indicator of collective action (see Okamoto 2003) .
The data we report on here were collected as part of the Immigrant Civic and Political Incorporation (ICPI) project. We focus on the year 2000 for our analysis because of the increasing presence of immigrants in new destinations across the United States (Marrow 2005; Waters and Jiménez 2005) . In addition, we are able to estimate more reliable measures for percent foreign born, percent change in foreign-born population, size of metropolitan area, poverty rate, and our segregation indices, using census data at the metropolitan level for the year 2000 than for inter-census years. This is especially the case for smaller, new destinations such as Lincoln, NE or Lexington, KY, which make up about one-third of our sample. We also argue that it is important to document and understand the activities in these communities before the 2006 demonstrations, especially because scholars and policy makers tend to assume that immigrant groups did not politically awaken until the introduction of H.R. 4437. Nevertheless, the year 2000 is anomalous because it was an election and decennial census year, which may have led to greater newspaper coverage of immigrant collective action. Table 1 includes yearly protest totals for the 52 metropolitan areas, and Table 2 provides descriptive information for the 231 total protest events that occurred in these metropolitan areas. Just over half of the events took place in the five traditional immigrant gateways and the remaining events occurred in 25 metropolitan areas outside of traditional gateways such as Omaha and Charlotte. No protests were reported in 22 of the 52 metropolitan areas under study. These metropolitan areas tended to have smaller than average foreign-born populations compared to metropolitan areas in our sample where protests were reported (4 percent and 11 percent, respectively). In general, these descriptive results suggest that immigrant gateways had a higher frequency of protest events involving immigrants than new destinations.
Description of Events
Latinos (including Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans) were highly represented in our sample in terms of the total number and share of immigrant events, which is related to their larger share of the immigrant population across the 52 metropolitan areas. In fact, Latinos were involved in 73 percent of the events in new destinations and 65 percent of the events in traditional gateways. The visibility of political action among immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean (such as Haitians, Somalis, and Nigerians), Asia (including Vietnamese, Chinese, and Indians), and the Middle East (including Palestinians and Iranians) each represented less than 10 percent of the protests in new destinations and gateways.
Even though many of the events in our sample involved participants from one national origin group (i.e., Mexican, Vietnamese, Haitian), nearly three-quarters of the events dealt with grievances related to the broader immigrant community. In other words, these events were characterized by claims made on behalf of the larger immigrant community in the local area and at times, across the state and nation, which evoked a shared minority status among 9. To ensure that we coded the events in a uniform way, we developed an extensive codebook and coding sheet. We conducted intensive training sessions for coders and intercoder reliability ranged between 95 and 97 percent. immigrants. An example of this includes a petition with nearly 3,000 signatures mailed on behalf of Atlanta's Korean community to members of the U.S. Congress. This petition encouraged the revision of the 1996 law that lowered the minimum prison sentence that triggers deportation proceedings against individuals convicted of a crime from five years to one year. The Korean community's protest efforts were in reaction to the deportation of a Korean deacon who was involved in a minor offense. While only one national origin group participated, the protest's impact was consequential to the larger immigrant community in the United States A number of events represented the collective efforts of multiple immigrant groups. For instance, thousands of immigrants and their supporters participated in a peaceful demonstration in Chicago in September 2000, with the hope of drawing public attention to the need for a new amnesty program to legalize millions of undocumented immigrants across the country. Leaders, activists, politicians, and local residents from the Latino, Asian, and Polish communities joined in a lively march to the Federal Plaza that culminated in a rally where local leaders as well as individuals who were legalized under the 1986 amnesty legislation presented inspiring speeches. Another example includes a protest in Minneapolis where a diverse group of immigrants from Somalia, Tibet, Bosnia, Mexico, and Laos walked the picket line and passed out leaflets in front of the Hilton hotel to advocate for better working conditions and higher wages for immigrant laborers. Their collective efforts were used to gain the attention of the business community and to generate support from the larger public.
The remaining one-quarter of the events in our sample were characterized by ethnicspecific claims. For example, in July 2000, a public demonstration took place in Houston denouncing the police killing of a Mexican national. More than 100 protesters from the Mexican immigrant community along with representatives from the Mexican consulate attended the event, where protesters expressed their concerns over the fourth killing of a Mexican immigrant by Houston police in less than three years. The claims made here were ethnic specific and did not bridge the immediate concerns in the Mexican community to make a broader statement about immigrant rights. Another example includes an event that took place in September 2000 in Palm Beach, when more than 400 Haitians participated in a protest against unfair treatment by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Haitian refugees claimed that federal laws favored Cubans and other nonblack national origin groups, and pressed for an extension of the Haitian Fairness Act that allowed undocumented immigrants who arrived in the United States before 1996 to qualify for legal permanent residency. This event clearly focused on the claims of one national origin group. In general, whether the claims were made by one or several national origin groups, the issues around which immigrants organized often signaled their location at the margins of the mainstream, how their status as full citizens was questioned, and disparate treatment from agents of the state.
In our sample of events, bias/discrimination was the most frequent type of claim, and in many cases these challenges to unfair treatment based on minority status were aimed at the local government. For example, members of the Organizing Asian Communities/Southeast Asian Youth Leadership Project (CAAAV) protested the lack of bilingual case workers and translation services at New York City's Human Resources Administration, claiming that the shortfalls of the administration violated their civil rights by discriminating against non-English speakers. Demonstrations and rallies were the most common form of immigrant collective action, but organizers for some of the events went through more formal institutional channels to challenge the status quo, such as filing a complaint or a lawsuit or attending a meeting to make their claims heard. For example, 600 Latino community members attended a city council meeting in Smyrna, Georgia to protest the mayor's comments following the arrest of Mexican bricklayers accused of violating a local ordinance. The mayor stated that he was "bothered by the use of taxpayers' money to teach police another language so that they could communicate with newcomers" when responding to the suggestion that the arrests stemmed from a language barrier (Rodriguez 2000) . The Latino community's strong collective response made clear that discriminatory statements from the mayor and disparate treatment from local officials were unacceptable.
Although most protest events consisted of one activity or form, some events were composed of multiple activities. For example, a protest of about 300 Liberian immigrants at Minnesota's State Capitol consisted of a march and a demonstration. This event was meant to pressure U.S. senators to support a new bill that would allow immigrants who had been granted temporary visas after fleeing the Liberian civil war in the early 1990s to remain in the United States permanently. Nearly 70 percent of the events targeted the state, including law enforcement and local, state, and federal governments. All of the events that targeted local law enforcement focused on racial profiling or police brutality, and most events aimed at the federal government were related to immigrant amnesty, deportation, and refugee or immigration policy. The majority of the events in our sample lasted less than a day, but some events took place over several days and even weeks. For example, immigrants from Poland, Vietnam, Eritrea, and the former Yugoslavia picketed in front of a St. Louis packaging company for over four weeks to protest the exploitation of immigrant laborers.
Independent Variables
The event data were matched with independent variables measuring political opportunity, resources, and boundary markers to test our hypotheses about the conditions influencing immigrant collective action. All of the independent and control variables are measured at the metropolitan level unless stated otherwise (see Table 3 ).
Political Opportunity. To measure the political opportunities available to immigrants, we constructed a dichotomous variable measuring the availability of non-English ballots in at least one county in the metropolitan area in 1996 (see Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001) . 10 The availability of Spanish and other non-English ballots is an indicator of the relative openness of the political system. Even though the Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires that jurisdictions with a significant population of language minority voters provide bilingual voting assistance, not all do so. We also include an indicator of Democratic strength using the percent votes cast for the presidential Democratic candidate in 2000. The logic here is that metropolitan areas with greater Democratic strength will be more receptive to the concerns and causes of the immigrant population. Finally, we include an indicator of the presence of elite allies using the number of Asian American and Latino elected officials by state. We constructed this measure using data from the National Association of Latino Appointed and Elected Officials (NALEO) via the U.S. Statistical Abstract, and from the National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac (Nakanishi and Lai 2000) . We matched these state-level data with the primary state of the metropolitan area. The prospects for successful mobilization efforts are higher in contexts with elite allies, and therefore metropolitan areas in states with greater minority representation should experience higher counts of immigrant protest. In sum, our measures capture different dimensions of political opportunity (McAdam 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 2004) : the relative openness of the political system, the receptivity of local elites, and the presence of influential allies.
Resources.
To capture the level of resources available within the immigrant group, we used 2000 census data to measure percent foreign born who were U.S. citizens in the metropolitan area. U.S. citizenship is a resource that the group can use to engage in successful collective action. Immigrants who have not naturalized as citizens may not be willing leaders or participants of collective action for fear of arrest or deportation. We also created a variable from 2000 census data measuring percent foreign born who were college educated in the metropolitan area. Like U.S. citizenship, the percent college educated is an internal resource for the immigrant community, as educated individuals might have more established networks that facilitate 10. These were the most recent data we could find for this variable. collective activity. Collective organizing efforts often require contact and interaction with mainstream institutions and authorities that may keep noncitizens and the less educated from participating.
To measure organizational resources, we constructed a variable measuring the proportion of organizations in the metropolitan area that serve or aid immigrants from GuideStar, a comprehensive database of over 1.5 million nonprofits registered with the IRS. 11 We conducted an extensive search using a variety of search terms and included ethnic and immigrant organizations such as the Immigrant Workers Citizenship Project (Las Vegas, NV), Mi Casa Resource Center (Denver, CO), and Asian American Coalition for Children and Families (New York, NY), which provide services and advocacy for immigrants.
12 These organizations operate as a resource for the immigrant population by providing access to information, services, and networks of support but they also can play a role in shaping immigrants' sense of shared status. These organizations often provide a narrative about the shared experiences and inequities faced by immigrants (see Brettel and Reed-Danahay 2008; de Graaw 2008) . Because Guidestar may miss smaller organizations, we recognize that this measure represents a lower-bound estimate of the resources to which immigrants have access in local communities.
Taken together, our measures capture both internal and external resources available to the immigrant group within a metropolitan area to ascertain the extent to which they encourage immigrant collective action.
Threat to Immigrants. To measure threat to immigrants, we created a count of anti-immigrant activity in metropolitan areas from newspaper data in 2000. Examples include physical attacks against immigrants, anti-immigrant vandalism, mass deportations or arrests of undocumented immigrants by the local police or INS, as well as English-only campaigns and antiimmigration rallies. These events represented collective efforts by established native groups to maintain symbolic and material boundaries between immigrants and natives, whether they were focused on eliminating bilingual education, blocking immigrants' access to health care, or deporting noncitizens. Events coded as threats were public and participants clearly stated an anti-immigrant claim or engaged in actions that restricted the rights and/or services accorded to immigrants. Given selection bias associated with newspaper coverage, this variable represents a count of publicly visible anti-immigrant activities in the metropolitan area.
We also created a count of immigrant legislation introduced by state legislatures in the year 2000 that restricted the rights and resources accorded to immigrants. These data were gleaned from LexisNexis Total Research System, and collected and coded using a guide provided by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) (Laglagaron et al. 2008) . MPI is a nonpartisan think tank devoted to collecting and analyzing information about migration and refugee policies. These bills covered a variety of topics, including driver's licenses, education, employment, housing, health care, voting, and the enforcement of federal laws, to name a few. An example of a bill that would have restricted immigrant rights and services includes California Assembly Bill 60. Introduced in December of 2000, this bill proposed to restrict issuing driver's licenses or identification cards to persons with legal status. Another example is Minnesota Senate 11. We originally constructed a variable measuring the number of organizations serving immigrant and ethnic groups, but this variable was highly correlated with percent foreign born, and we were unable to include it in our models due to problems with collinearity. Thus, we decided to construct and use a relative share measure.
12. We collected these data in 2007 and conducted a random 5-percent sample of the organizations to ascertain if they were active in 2000. Out of the 298 organizations in the 5-percent sample, we found IRS ruling year (the year an organization applies for 501(c)(3) status) information for 276, with 64 organizations reporting ruling years after the year 2000. In other words, 77 percent of the organizations in our study were active in 2000. This is a conservative estimate; in all likelihood, the percentage is much closer to 90 percent. We found both IRS ruling year and self-reported organizational founding year for 39 of the 276 organizations, which showed that the IRS ruling date consistently follows the actual organizational founding year-a median of three years according to these data. Whether 10 percent or 25 percent of the organizations were inactive in the year 2000 is less of an issue for the purposes of our article, as our measure is a relative measure (the proportion of all organizations that are immigrant groups) rather than a count of organizations.
Bill 2732, which would have required the verification of immigration status of applicants for child care assistance. These state-level data were matched with the primary state of the metropolitan area. We lagged the variable measuring anti-immigrant activity by one month and the variable measuring restrictionist legislation by one and five months to test the effects of threatening actions on collective action.
Group Segregation. To examine the extent to which immigrants and natives are segregated from one another, we used 2000 census data to calculate indices of occupational and residential dissimilarity comparing the foreign-born population with native-born non-Hispanic whites. 13 We used native-born non-Hispanic whites as the comparison instead of all natives because we recognize that race and ethnicity play an important role in social and economic difference and exclusion (Lee et al. 2006) . The occupational and residential indices both measured the proportion of immigrants that would need to change occupations or neighborhoods to achieve an even distribution in the labor or housing market (see Jacobs 1989; Massey and Denton 1987) . Both indices ranged from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating complete segregation. We used these two measures of segregation to create an ordinal segregation variable, where 0 = low residential and occupational segregation, 1 = low residential and high occupational, or low occupational and high residential segregation, and 2 = high occupational and residential segregation.
14 We constructed this variable by standardizing both measures of segregation for all metropolitan areas in the United States and constructing two dichotomous variables (one for residential and the other for occupational segregation) where 1 = relatively high segregation (greater than 0 on the standardized scale) and 0 = relatively low segregation (less than or equal to 0 on the standardized scale). We combined these two dichotomous variables into one ordinal measure of segregation to test the influence of spatial boundaries on immigrant collective action.
Control Variables. We include control variables measuring the size of the total population in the metropolitan area, poverty rate, and percent foreign born in 2000. We also include a variable measuring percent change in the foreign-born population between 1990 and 2000. Finally, to control for autocorrelation (see Barron 1992) , we include a variable measuring whether a protest event occurred in the metropolitan area in the previous month.
Estimation Technique
Our dependent variable is the monthly count of immigrant collective action events in each of the 52 immigrant destinations during the year 2000. We use metropolitan area month as our unit of analysis because two of our three measures for boundary markers varied by month, allowing us to test the effect of prior anti-immigrant activity and legislation on the current count of immigrant protest. We analyze a total of 572 observations (11 months * 52 metro areas).
15
To assess the effects of political opportunities, resources, and boundary markers on immigrant collective action, we use Poisson-logit hurdle regression models because of overdispersion and the high number of zero counts in the data. 16 The hurdle model is a modified 13. We thank John Iceland for his generosity in sharing the residential segregation data with us. 14. As a check, we calculated segregation indices between native-born and foreign-born residents and included these variables in the model. In general, we find the same results, but include the segregation indices between nativeborn non-Hispanic whites and the foreign born because this captures the dynamics of race and immigration that would be missed otherwise.
15. We include 11 instead of 12 months because our measure for anti-immigrant activity is lagged by one month. We also estimated models with metropolitan area as the unit of analysis (N = 52) and find similar results.
16. We fit the count portion of the models with zero-truncated negative binomial (ZTNB) regression models, which reports results of a likelihood ratio chi-square test of alpha and allows for a test for overdispersion. The results of the test were not significant, indicating that ZTNB regression models were not preferred over the ZTP regression models. count model that allows estimation of a two-stage process: the first part of the model-the zero-hurdle component (in this case a logit regression model)-estimates the probability of observing a protest event. The second part of the model-the count component (in this case a zero-truncated Poisson regression or ZTP model)-provides estimates for independent variables that affect the expected count of protest events. The model receives its name because if the value of the dependent variable is positive in the logit part of the model, then the "hurdle is crossed" and the distribution of the positive count values will be estimated in the second part of the model (see Cameron and Trivedi 2009; Long and Freese 2006; Rose et al. 2006; Zeileis, Kleiber, and Jackman 2008) .
17
After computing collinearity diagnostics for each regression model, we concluded that multicollinearity was not a problem. 18 To adjust for intragroup correlation due to repeated observations in metropolitan areas, we used the cluster command in Stata, which produced robust standard errors (Wooldridge 2002) . Table 4 provides the results from the regression models. If a boundary heightening mechanism is not necessary for immigrants to engage in protest events, then we should find that the coefficients for political opportunity and resources variables are significant in reduced models and that the coefficients for the boundary marker variables-threats and segregation-are not significant in the full model. All of the theoretically derived and control variables are included in the two stages of the hurdle model because we are interested in the contextual factors that influence the occurrence and count of immigrant collective action across metropolitan areas.
Results
In Model 1, where only control variables are included, we find that metropolitan areas with larger populations and with higher percentages of the foreign born are associated with an increased likelihood of protest activity (logit part). In metropolitan areas where a protest event did occur, a higher poverty rate and an immigrant protest event in the prior month were associated with greater counts of collective action (Poisson part). Percent change in foreign-born population, however, did not affect the occurrence or number of protests within metropolitan areas.
Model 2 includes political opportunity and resources variables and here we discover that only one political opportunity variable, percent voting Democrat in the 2000 election, is important for predicting immigrant protest (significant at the .10 level). Specifically, a 1-percent increase in Democratic voters in a metropolitan area is associated with an increase in the odds of a protest event by a factor of 1.0 (e .34 = 1.024) (see Appendix for odds ratios). The availability of bilingual ballots and number of Asian/Latino elected officials do not influence whether an immigrant protest occurs or not (logit part), and none of the political opportunity variables predict the count of immigrant protests (Poisson part).
In terms of resources, the coefficients for all three measures (Model 2) are significant predictors of whether a protest event will occur or not, but these same variables have no 17. The hurdle model is similar to a zero-inflated count model: both assume a two-stage process-transition and event stages-but ZIP models take on zero counts in the events stage, while hurdle models assume that the count distribution is truncated at zero.
18. The mean variance inflation factors (VIF) for our models were between 1.6 and 4.5 (the higher scores occurring in the count models). The individual VIFs were between 1.1 (number of state-level restrictionist bills) and 8.7 (percent foreign born), and after removing percent foreign born from the collinearity diagnostics, we found that this variable was driving the high mean VIF scores. When we removed this variable from the count models, however, none of the coefficients in our models significantly changed, indicating that the inclusion of percent foreign born does not cause significant problems, at least for the purposes of this article. With this in mind, and because of the theoretical importance of the variable, we chose to keep it in the models. influence on the count of immigrant protest events. In particular, we find that when there are higher percentages of the foreign born who are U.S. citizens or college educated, the probability of a protest event declines. These findings suggest that internal group resources discourage collective action, which is contrary to expectations. Our results also indicate that when immigrant organizations represent an increasing relative share of all organizations in a metropolitan area, this increases the probability of immigrant protests, as predicted. Although this coefficient is marginally significant, a one-unit increase in the relative share of organizations serving immigrants is associated with an increase in the odds of a protest event by a factor of 2.4 (e .889 = 2.432). We also find that when controlling for political opportunity and resources, the positive effects of percent foreign born and size of the metropolitan area remain significant in the logit part of Model 2. In addition, metropolitan areas with higher poverty rates and greater increases in the foreign-born population between 1990 and 2000 are associated with a lower probability of immigrant protest activity. The latter finding is likely due to the fact that immigrants in new destinations do not yet have an established presence in these locations that affects their ability to organize successful protests. Including the political opportunity and resources variables improves the fit of the logit model (p < .001) but not the ZTP model.
Turning to Model 3, we add the new theoretical variables measuring the extent to which immigrants are marked as separate and distinct from the larger community. While the addition of these variables does not improve the fit of the logit model, the marginally significant and positive effect of anti-immigrant events in the prior month suggests that local threats are important in distinguishing between metropolitan areas with and without protest activity. Each additional anti-immigrant event is associated with a 56-percent ([e .442 -1]*100 = 55.6) increase in the odds of immigrant protest. The remaining variables measuring boundary markers do not, however, distinguish between metropolitan areas with and without protest activity, but they do have significant effects on the count of immigrant protest activity. We find that higher levels of immigrant-native segregation increase the expected count of immigrant protests. In fact, for each one-unit increase in immigrant-native segregation, the expected count of protest events increase by a factor of 2.5 (e .907 = 2.477) (see Appendix for incidence rate ratios). Because our measure of segregation takes occupational and residential segregation into account, our results reveal that segregation in labor and housing markets are both important for understanding group action. Spatial segregation in both arenas operates as a boundary marker that generates common interests, shared networks, and interaction among immigrants, and this in turn increases their capacity for collective action.
Our results also reveal that recent legislative threats decrease the expected count of immigrant collective action. For each additional restrictive bill introduced in the previous month, the count of immigrant protest in the current month decreases by 60 percent ([e -.918 -1] × 100) = -60.0). When we estimated our models using the number of restrictionist bills at variable lag times, however, we found a positive effect of legislative activity. In fact, bills introduced 5, 10, 11, and 12 months prior increased the expected count of immigrant collective action within metropolitan areas where collective action occurs. Model 3 reports the lag at five months. Each additional restrictive bill introduced five months prior is associated with a 39-percent ([e -.488 -1] * 100 = 38.6) increase in immigrant protest. 19 These results indicate that legislative activity consistently increases mobilization after a certain amount of time, providing evidence for a greater delay in the solidification of the immigrant-native boundary when applied to state-level legislative activity. Immigrants may experience fear and uncertainty when restrictive legislation is initially introduced, but over time, they are able to successfully navigate their everyday lives in the face of such threats and may develop a collective identity due to their 19. As a check, we estimated two separate models-one with the number of restrictionist bills at t-1 and another with the number of restrictionist bills at t-5, and the results were the virtually the same as reported in Table 4 . The two variables were not highly correlated and the individual VIFs for these variables were below 1.2. shared experiences and status. In turn, a shared immigrant identity facilitates organizing upon that basis to extend their social and political rights.
Interestingly, one of the political opportunity variables becomes significant in the ZTP model when the boundary marker variables are included (see Model 3). Specifically, we find that access to formal political incorporation through the availability of bilingual ballots negatively influences immigrant protest. In fact, areas with bilingual ballots are associated with a 67-percent ([e -.1.099 -1] * 100) = 66.7) decrease in the number of immigrant protests, net of other factors. This is interesting because the effect of political opportunities here, conceptualized as an indicator of the relative openness of the political system, did not operate in the expected direction. In analyses not shown here, we find that it is only when segregation is taken into account that the availability of bilingual ballots is important for understanding immigrant protest. When segregation is omitted, this leads to biased estimates of the parameters in our model of immigrant organizing (see Greene 1993) .
Finally, including the new variables improves the fit of the ZTP model (p < .05) and suggests that boundary markers, which encourage the formation of a shared status and identity, are indeed important for understanding immigrant organizing.
Discussion and Conclusion
The present study moves toward an understanding of immigrant incorporation as a group or collective process by focusing on immigrant protest, an understudied dimension of political incorporation. We analyzed patterns of immigrant organizing across 52 metropolitan areas in the United States in 2000, and tested whether protest events were influenced by political opportunities, resources, and boundary markers-conditions heightening group boundaries between immigrants and natives. Our findings reveal that (1) political opportunities and resources both deter and encourage immigrant organizing, and (2) boundary processes are generally associated with higher counts of immigrant protest. In the following, we expand on the significance of these findings in light of previous research, and we discuss how the relative position of immigrant groups in gateways and new destinations can help us to understand these results.
First, our results demonstrate that contrary to expectations, political opportunities and resources did not uniformly encourage immigrant organizing. Only two of our measuresimmigrant organizations and percent voting Democratic in a metropolitan area-raised the probability of immigrant collective action, but other measures either had no effect or depressed the occurrence and expected count of immigrant protest. 20 In fact, in metropolitan areas with increased opportunities for immigrants to participate in local and national elections via bilingual ballots and higher percent citizens and educated among the foreign born, protest was less likely to be used as a strategy for social change. In other words, it could be that there is a reduced need for public challenges to the status quo in areas with greater access to formal means of incorporation via citizenship, college education, and voting.
Our findings confirm that immigrant-native segregation and anti-immigrant activityfactors maintaining the "brightness" of group boundaries-were important predictors of collective action where immigrants were the main organizers and participants. Threats to immigrants could have consistently created a hostile environment where group action was too risky, and immigrant-native segregation could have socially isolated immigrants, weakening their political opposition to unfair treatment and discriminatory practices. Instead, both facilitated immigrant collective action: anti-immigrant events raised the probability, while relatively high levels of residential and occupational segregation and the increasing number of restrictionist bills introduced several months prior encouraged greater levels of protest activity. In light of these findings, we presume that when group boundaries were heightened through the mechanisms of threat and segregation, this seemed to have encouraged the development of a shared minority status based on race, ethnicity, language, and/or citizenship, and facilitated immigrant protest. Overall, our results indicate that exclusionary contexts characterized by threats and segregation facilitate protest among immigrant groups, and inclusionary contexts characterized by higher degrees of and greater access to formal incorporation deter immigrant organizing.
Past research has found that an open political context strongly encourages immigrant political activity, which is not consistent with our results (Giugni and Passy 2004; Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 1999) . These studies typically measure political opportunities at the national level by examining citizenship regimes and anti-discrimination legislation in the European context that differs from our focus on local events and metropolitan-area level predictors. An exception is a study by Ruud Koopmans (2004) that analyzed immigrant mobilization within Germany, but still found a strong association between political opportunities at the local level-measured as higher naturalization rates, positive discursive environments, and weak conservative parties-and immigrant claims making. But this line of research might have found different results for yet another reason: their broad measure of immigrant mobilization includes all instances of political claims making irrespective of their form (i.e., speeches, legal actions, attacks against other groups) and content (includes issues unrelated to immigration). We use a narrower definition of immigrant mobilization and it is not surprising then that our results are more consistent with past studies of protest among disenfranchised populations such as racial minorities, women, and the homeless (see McCammon 2001; Minkoff 1997; Snow et al. 2005) .
Past studies that have investigated the effect of legislative threats on formal political participation did not capture the temporal pattern revealed in our study (see Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Ramakrishnan 2005) . In addition to the positive effect of restrictionist legislation several months prior, we found that the introduction of restrictive legislation one month prior discouraged protest. This pattern is reminiscent of Karen Rasler's (1996) study of the Iranian Revolution, which demonstrated that the threatening action of the state (i.e., mass arrests during and after demonstrations, bans on assemblies, press censorship) had a short-term negative effect and a long-term positive effect on levels of protest. So here, as in our study, citizens may experience fear and uncertainty when restrictions are initially introduced, but over time, they figure out how to navigate everyday interactions and are likely to develop a collective identity due to their shared experiences in the face of threats, which in turn facilitates mobilization.
In contrast to our findings about the facilitating effect of immigrant-native segregation, 21 other studies of collective action have found that the "brightest" boundaries were not in segregated settings but actually in newly integrated ones. For example, when the U.S. government mandated the racial integration of public schools in the late 1960s, whites felt threatened. A breakdown in racial segregation resulted in higher rates of black-white contact within a context of scarce resources-good public schools, safe neighborhoods-and in response, whites 21. Liang (1994) found that social contact with whites in residential areas or in workplaces generally increased the probability of naturalization. This is counter to our results and we think that this is largely due to the fact that a shared collective identity is not needed to apply for U.S. citizenship. In her study of Latino protest, Martinez (2008) used the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) and found that white-Latino residential segregation had no effect on Latino protest. Our results may differ from Martinez because we rely on actual protest events, not the self-report of participation. In addition, we include a measure of residential and occupational segregation in our models. participated in protests to defend their all-white spaces (Olzak, Shanahan, and West 1994) . While the competition model has received considerable support (see Nielsen 1985; Olzak 1992; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Soule 1992; Soule and Van Dyke 1999) , our results were not consistent with its main tenet about the instigating role of integration. This is largely because the logic of the theory does not easily apply to immigrants and ethnic/racial minorities due to their relatively low status in the social hierarchy. For immigrants, integration is typically equated with social mobility and new opportunities, so it is not clear why they would engage in protest activity. When local environments begin to integrate, it is established groups who are likely to feel that they are losing out, and in response may engage in protest and exclusionary activities. Thus, when new immigrants integrate occupational and residential spaces within local labor and housing markets where native-born residents predominate, this process may heighten group boundaries, but it should result in dominant group collective action (see Myers 1997; Okamoto 2003) . Immigrants may organize and participate in protests, but as shown by our research, it is not because they are defending their group boundaries in social and economic arenas against new groups who are encroaching upon their access to scarce resources; instead, they are responding to threats from the dominant group.
These insights about the application of competition theory to immigrants and ethnic minorities can help us to further understand our results regarding the inconsistent effects of political opportunities and resources. One plausible explanation is that these factors affect different groups in different ways. For example, in a study of racial-political organizations, Kimberly Ebert (2009) found that groups with social and political power were more likely to respond to political opportunities, and groups in relatively weak positions tended to mobilize in reaction to threats. In regards to our study, immigrant groups have relatively low levels of power and privilege, and therefore may be less likely to engage in collective action unless the boundary between immigrants and natives is heightened via segregation or threats.
22 But immigrants' social position could also vary in different contexts across the United States. Our results demonstrated that the occurrence of any protest event was less likely in metropolitan areas with larger increases in their foreign-born populations over the past decade-in new immigrant destinations like Nashville and Omaha. While some areas in the U.S. South and Midwest have responded to the influx of new immigrants by constructing new housing and schools, most have done little to serve the needs or incorporate the immigration population into the local community (Benson 2001; Neal and Bohon 2003; Schmid 2003; Stull and Broadway 2001) . In contrast, immigrant communities in established gateways such as Los Angeles and New York are relatively integrated into the mainstream political system and are likely to have greater access to political resources such as elites and networks (Jones-Correa 2005) . It might be the case then that immigrant groups respond differently to threats and opportunities in gateways than in new destinations because their social position varies in these different contexts.
To explore this possibility further, we categorized the content of the newspaper data and found that the events in new destinations were typically in response to local grievances such as the police shooting of an immigrant, discriminatory comments by an elected official about non-English speakers, or an INS factory raid that resulted in deportations of noncitizens. This is not to say that such events did not occur in gateways, but claims focusing on broader, long-term concerns such as amnesty were more frequent in gateways, and claims regarding local and more immediate issues were more frequent in new destinations. Even events that targeted the state in new destinations were reactive and focused on short-term threats. For 22. The petition regarding the deportation of the Korean deacon is a useful example of the facilitating role of threat. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which allowed the deportation of noncitizens who had served time for minor offenses such as drug possession or shoplifting. In 2000, Houston's Korean community-75 percent of whom were noncitizens-mobilized on a large scale only when they realized the precariousness of their position in the United States-that they too could be deported for a minor offense.
example, the prospect of English-only initiatives on statewide ballots constituted an immediate threat in metropolitan areas located in nongateway states such as Utah and Colorado in 2000. Thus, immigrant groups in new destinations may experience similar grievances as immigrants in gateways, but they are in a more precarious position that may prevent them from taking advantage of existing political opportunities and organizing protests that have broad, proactive, long-standing claims.
Our results provide an important first step and improved understanding of the conditions that encourage immigrants to engage in collective organizing. Our current models are based on one year of data, which limit the conclusions that we can draw. Future research should utilize longitudinal data to examine trends and analyze how changes in demographics, economic conditions, political opportunities, resources, and threats in different metropolitan areas influence immigrant collective action. It would also be worthwhile to explore the processes and mechanisms underlying the relationship found here between boundary markers and immigrant organizing. Such a focus will move toward a more dynamic understanding of political incorporation of contemporary immigrants in the United States. Note: To generate odds ratios and incidence rate ratios, the regression coefficients shown in Table 4 are exponentiated. When the odds ratios and incidence rate ratios are greater than 1, this is associated with an increase in the odds of an event; values less than 1 are associated with a decrease in the odds of an event. To calculate the percent change in the odds of a protest for a one-unit change in an independent variable, 1 is subtracted from the value of the ratio and multiplied by 100. † p < .10 *p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two tailed tests)
